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Despite a recent resurgence in research on the politics of migration, foreign policy 
analysts have yet to approach cross-border population mobility as a distinct field of 
inquiry. Particularly within the Global South, scant work has theorised the interplay 
between migration and interstate bargaining. This article proposes the framework of 
migration diplomacy to examine how mobility features in states’ issue-linkage strategies, 
in both cooperative and coercive contexts. Drawing on Arabic, French and English 
primary sources, it empirically demonstrates the salience of its framework through an 
analysis of Libya’s migration diplomacy towards its Arab, African and European 
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‘We do not have the word “idiot” written on our foreheads’, Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan declared in February 2016. ‘We will be patient but we will do what we 
have to do’, he continued, signalling his intention to employ Turkey’s position as a transit 
state for Syrian refugees as leverage against the European Union (EU). ‘Don’t think that 
the planes and the buses are there for nothing’, he concluded.1 While considerable 
attention has been paid to the domestic political consequences of cross-border mobility, 
the ways through which migration management features in states’ diplomatic conduct 
remains under-theorised. Despite a wealth of empirical studies identifying states’ 
regulation of migration and asylum practices as foreign policy instruments, the relevant 
literature has yet to provide a coherent framework for analysing the relationship between 
diplomacy and cross-border mobility. This is particularly true in the Global South: 
research on the politics of migration continues to focus pre- dominantly on host states 
within the Global North, namely the United States, Canada and Western Europe, despite 
the fact that the majority of migratory flows continue to occur within, and across, 
developing countries. How does migration feature in the conduct of states’ diplomacy in 
the Global South?  
This article paves the way for a major new direction in the study of the politics of inter- 
national migration by putting forth two arguments. Firstly, states engage in migration 
diplomacy, namely the use of diplomatic tools, processes and procedures to manage cross-
border population mobility, including both the strategic use of migration flows as a 
means to obtain other aims, and the use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related 
to migration. Secondly, states within the Global South develop manifold diplomatic 
strategies in managing diverse migration flows via issue linkage, by engaging in both 
cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy. Although the line between the two types is 
frequently blurred, cooperative migration diplomacy is predicated upon interstate 
bargaining explicitly aiming for mutually beneficial arrangements in the absence of 
aggression. On the other hand, a state may pursue coercive migration diplomacy if it 
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resorts to violence or the threat of force, or if it adopts a unilateral approach to interstate 
bargaining.  
The article draws upon an extreme case of a Global South state, namely Libya under 
Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled between 1969 and 2011, in order to test its novel 
theorisation of cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy. The article goes beyond 
existing research on Libyan policymaking regarding migration, which has conceptualised 
Libya as a powerful, oil-producing rentier state, as an unequal trade partner of European 
states and the EU, or as driven by the erratic behaviour of Gaddafi himself. Rather, the 
article demonstrates how Libyan politics on population mobility are best understood 
through the framework of cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy, both of which 
were employed by Libya in its bargaining with neighbouring states: Gaddafi’s strategy 
towards Arab states focused on securing mainly foreign policy concessions, while his 
strategy vis-a ̀-vis the EU and individual member states expanded to also include material 
gains.  
Overall, the article makes two contributions: firstly, it provides a comprehensive analysis 
of Libyan migration politics during the 40-year rule of Colonel Gaddafi that ties both 
regional and international politics into a coherent analytical framework. It thereby 
contributes to work on Middle East states’ foreign policy, and enriches the empirical 
literature on the inter- play between migration and diplomacy through an under-
examined case within the Global South. Secondly, it develops the concepts of 
cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy as a novel object of study and research, 
which furthers the theorisation on issue-linkage and cross-border mobility politics from a 
foreign policy analysis perspective.  
In terms of its structure, the article initially identifies a number of works that empirically 
examine migration policy as an instrument of diplomacy but have yet to propose a 
coherent theoretical framework with regard to issue-linkage strategies, or with a focus on 
the Global South. In response, it develops the concept of migration diplomacy, and 
proceeds to examine how issue linkage features in states’ cooperative and coercive 
migration diplomacy. It fleshes out its approach empirically through the extreme case of 
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Libya: during the Cold War, Libyan migration diplomacy sought foreign policy gains 
from Arab sending states; in the post-1990 period, it reoriented towards gaining primarily 
material concessions from the EU and individual European member states, as well as 
supporting Gaddafi’s vision of a “united” Africa. The article concludes with a discussion 
on how its findings are significant beyond the Libyan case, as well as how future research 
may advance its theoretical framework.  
 
The international politics of migration in the Global South  
Theories of international relations, as well as the subfield of research into the politics of 
migration, have approached labour migration in various ways, and have only recently 
attempted to theorise on the role of the state.2 Traditionally, within the realist and 
neorealist tradition, international migration would be considered a “low” rather than a 
“high” politics issue and would not factor into analyses of foreign or national security 
policy. Notable exceptions, such as research by Zolberg, as well as Reiner and Russell, on 
the political dimension of mobility,3 tended to focus specifically on immigration and 
border controls. With the possible exception of historical work on global migration 
politics between the two Cold War camps,4 a key characteristic of this scholarship is also 
a tendency ‘to focus on the consequences of immigration in wealthy, migrant-receiving 
societies, and to ignore the causes and consequences of migration in countries of origin 
within the Global South.5 For structuralist scholars of world-systems theory, the divide 
between sending, transit and host states matters even less, as international migration 
flows result from economic interests operating in the domestic and international 
systems.6  
This is not to argue that the literature has not identified the importance of migration or 
asylum policies in states’ diplomatic practices. A growing number of scholars examine 
how countries of destination link their immigration, asylum and refugee policies to their 
foreign policy priorities, albeit primarily within the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) or the EU context.7 An emerging literature, 
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building on a broadly constructivist framework, has developed the foreign policy field of 
‘diaspora politics’.8 While including numerous Global South states, such research does 
not typically examine interstate relations, traditionally focusing on diasporic actors as the 
unit of analysis. A small group of scholars have recently shifted their attention to sending 
states and country-of-origin politics,9 but they similarly examine state–diaspora relations, 
rather than interstate diplomacy. At the same time, the research agenda on ‘emigration 
states’ further reifies an analytic categorisation between policies developed by countries 
of immigration and emigration. This prevents an accurate examination of policies 
developed by states, particularly within the Global South, which regulate more than one 
type of cross-border mobility. Jordan, Egypt and Turkey, for instance, develop complex, 
multi-tier policies on emigration, immigration and transit migration, as well as diaspora 
and refugee issues that cannot adequately be analysed via a unitary perspective based on 
these policies’ target actors.10  
Expanding beyond the literature on migration politics, two main groups of foreign policy 
analysts allow for a closer examination of the interplay between diplomacy and cross-
border mobility that may be expanded to the Global South: on the one hand, building on 
liberal trade theory and neo-functionalism, scholars of complex interdependence argue 
that growing interconnectedness, through international migration or other forms, 
contributes to cooperation and stability.11 A line of liberal institutionalist thinkers argue 
that free movement of people, and rising levels of cooperation and interdependence, 
would reduce the need for coercion in international relations.12 One notable example 
would be the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community; the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris ensconced the right to free movement of labour within the signatory states, 
ostensibly as a way of enhancing interstate cooperation in the aftermath of World War 
II.13 While similar debates have been identified in the Global South, the extent to which 
they have contributed to interstate cooperation and the absence of conflict has yet to be 
examined.  
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On the other hand, a line of security studies scholars argue that migration might 
contribute to coercive, rather than cooperative, interstate relations. In terms of interstate 
relations, Greenhill has analysed states’ abilities to engender targeted migration and 
refugee ‘crises’ in order to shape decision-making processes within the targeted host 
state.14 Her framework suggests that elites in conflict-prone countries are willing to 
exploit threats to launch migration waves vis-a ̀-vis liberal regimes in order to coerce them 
into concessions because of costs imposed on their civilian populations. But Greenhill’s 
argumentation does not extend into illiberal regimes, frequently found within the Global 
South, which would be expected to be less prone to such coercion. Similarly, a number of 
scholars have empirically highlighted the importance of migration in non-OECD states’ 
foreign policies within historical case studies, but without treating it as a separate line of 
theoretical inquiry.15 Focusing on Jordan, for instance, Brand argues that ‘it may make 
sense to think of ... Jordanian expatriate labor in Kuwait’ as a form of ‘economic 
statecraft’, but she does not carry this argument any further.16 The following section aims 
to synthesise states’ cooperative and coercive diplomatic practices on matters of cross-
border mobility in a novel framework of migration diplomacy and issue linkage.  
 
Theorising cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy  
This article aims to build on aforementioned work in conceptualising how cross-border 
population mobility affects the conduct of states’ diplomacy, and puts forth two research 
hypotheses. Firstly, it hypothesises that migratory flows across national borders 
constitute an object of interstate diplomacy, affecting states’ diplomatic relations with 
other actors in the international system, or migration diplomacy. While this phenomenon is 
not new, as mentioned earlier, it has yet to constitute a separate field of inquiry within 
international relations, thereby restricting theorisation on the importance of cross-border 
mobility for interstate relations. For the purposes of this analysis, migration diplomacy is 
defined as the use of diplomatic tools, processes and procedures to manage cross-border 
population mobility, including both the strategic use of migration flows as a means to 
obtain other aims, and the use of diplomatic methods to achieve goals related to 
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migration.17 Immigration laws, bilateral or multilateral readmission agreements, policies 
of secondment and diaspora out-reach, or deportation regulations typically constitute 
notable tools of migration diplomacy.  
How does migration diplomacy feature in the strategies of states in the Global South? 
The article’s second hypothesis is that states in the Global South employ cooperative and 
coercive migration diplomacy in their management of cross-border mobility. This article 
introduces existing work from the literature on issue-linkage processes – that is, 
simultaneous negotiations on two or more issues aiming for joint settlement –18 in order 
to comprehend how it may be employed in cooperative or coercive interstate bargaining 
within the Global South. With regard to the literature on the politics of migration, the 
focus on issue-linkage migration diplomacy in the Global South allows for a bypassing of 
the artificial categorisation between countries of origin and destination. With regard to 
the literature on issue linkage, the article shifts the scholarly discussion away from the 
expectation that linkage constitutes a mechanism mainly for stronger states within the 
Global North to impose their will upon weaker states.19 Existing analyses of linkage or 
‘suasion games’, identifying hegemonic powers’ strategies over other actors in the 
international system,20 do not usually examine weaker states within the Global South as 
engaging in issue linkage, save in discussions on military conflict or counterinsurgency.21 
This article highlights how, in the absence of other forms of leverage typically at the 
disposal of stronger, developed countries, Global South states are able to use migration 
diplomacy as issue linkage.  
I define coercive migration diplomacy as the threat or act by a state, or coalition of states, to affect 
either migration flows to/from a target state or its migrant stock as a punishment, unless the target state 
acquiesces to an articulated political or economic demand. This is reminiscent of the use of 
negative sanctions in international relations.22 One recent example of such a process 
would be the negotiations around the February 2016 ‘Jordan Compact’. As a host state of 
thousands of Syrian refugees, fleeing their homeland since 2011, Jordan was able to 
negotiate major economic benefits from various international actors. In return, Jordan 
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pledged to continue hosting and providing employment opportunities for Syrian refugees 
within its borders.23 Similarly, I define cooperative migration diplomacy as the promise or act 
by a state, or coalition of states, to affect either migration flows to/from a target state or its migrant stock 
as a reward, provided that the target state acquiesces to an articulated political or economic demand. This 
is reminiscent of the use of positive sanctions in international relations.24 In November 
2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24M military aircraft, President Putin 
responded by unilaterally suspending visa-free travel for Turkish citizens seeking 
employment in Russia. A few years back, in 1999, Japan threatened to ban all migrant 
remittances sent to North Korea (estimated at $600 million to $1 billion USD, annually) 
if Pyongyang did not abandon its plans to test-fire long-range ballistic missiles.25 
Although the line between the two types is frequently blurred, cooperative migration 
diplomacy is predicated upon interstate bargaining explicitly aiming for mutually 
beneficial arrangements in the absence of aggression. On the other hand, a state may 
pursue coercive migration diplomacy if it resorts to violence or the threat of force, or if it 
is driven by a unilateral approach to interstate bargaining. The article proceeds to tests its 
two main hypotheses – namely that cross-border mobility constitutes an object of 
interstate diplomacy, and that states aim to affect migration flows and/or migrant stocks 
through coercive and cooperative issue-linkage strategies in accordance with articulated 
political or economic demands.  
 
Libyan migration diplomacy – methodology and case selection  
In testing these two hypotheses, the article employs a case study, focusing on Libya under 
Colonel Gaddafi (1969 to 2011) through within-case analysis. Libya constitutes an 
‘extreme’ case, an unusual example of a Global South state consistently employing both 
coercive and cooperative migration diplomacy throughout the Gaddafi period. It is 
chosen for exploratory purposes with regard to the causal mechanisms proposed, for it 
allows for a maximisation of variance on strategies issue-linkage strategies, both on the 
coercive and cooperative ends. Extreme cases are also able to provide in-depth insights 
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and rich information.26 In that respect, it is similar to countries such as Jordan or Turkey. 
Libya is distinguished from Jordan due to its position in the transit migration route to 
Europe, and also differs from Turkey given its historically focal position as destination of 
both Arab and African labour migration. Both aspects raise Libya’s profile as critical in 
testing the article’s theory on multiple modes of issue-linkage migration diplomacy.  
While a number of scholars have produced work on Libyan migration politics, 
particularly in the last decade, research continues to be rather fragmented: Libya is 
analysed either with regard solely to intra-Arab migration,27 or with regard to its relations 
to the Global North.28 At the same time, the majority of works treat Libyan policy under 
Gaddafi as ad hoc and contradictory,29 ‘ebullient’ or ‘unpredictable’,30 or operating under 
‘controlled chaos’.31 While this article does not intend to discount the personality of 
Colonel Gaddafi in shaping Libyan politics, it also seeks to move beyond broadly 
Orientalist interpretations of Arab states’ policymaking processes as incomprehensible or 
illogical. Instead, it aims to provide a first synthesis of Libyan migration politics in the 
1969–2011 period under a coherent theoretical framework.  
While a long debate continues as to the merits of the case-study approach to social 
sciences research,32 there is a broad understanding that it is particularly apt with regard to 
the exploration of new concepts and allows the fine-tuning of the early stages of a 
research agenda, as is the goal here.33 With regard to data collection, it needs to be noted 
that work in authoritarian contexts presents unique challenges, particularly in the Middle 
East where migration is traditionally considered a security issue for Arab elites.34 At the 
same time, research on migration politics suffers from a lack of easily accessible and 
reliable statistical data.35 To overcome these issues, this article relies upon a meticulous 
collection of the cov- erage of regional labour migration issues across three main 
Egyptian newspapers (al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Gumhuriya). In an attempt to fill in gaps and 
substantiate Egyptian reporting, I also draw on Libyan media sources as well as the 
international press. Finally, for the purposes of triangulation, I employ semi-structured 
expert and elite interviews conducted in Cairo (n = 31) between July 2013 and June 2014.  
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Libyan migration diplomacy in the Arab world  
This section examines Libyan migration diplomacy towards its Arab counterparts, 
particularly Egypt and Tunisia, between 1969 and 2011, and identifies strategies of issue 
linkage with regard to both interstate cooperation and coercion. It is worth noting that 
Libya quickly became a prime destination of migrant labour in the Middle East once oil 
was discovered in 1957. In the early 1950s, the newly independent kingdom, having 
emerged following the collapse of Italy’s colonial endeavours in World War II, suffered 
from a lack of trained labour: indicatively, the 1954 census identified 81% of the 
population as illiterate. Ten years later, in 1964, the percentage of Libyans who had 
completed primary education did not exceed 5.2%.36 Not unlike the experience of newly 
independent Arab states of the Gulf, Libyan development necessarily relied upon the 
influx of skilled and unskilled migrant labour.37  
Egyptian and Tunisian migrant labour enjoyed particularly favourable access to the 
Libyan economy in the early years of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s rule, who had ousted 
King Idris, the country’s first ruler post-independence, through a bloodless coup d’état in 
1969. In these early years of rule, Libya’s regional migration diplomacy was employed as 
an instrument of closer cooperation with neighbouring Arab states. While the facilitation 
of immigration was economically beneficial to the Libyan state, the distinct preference 
for Arab workers was a politically motivated decision. A 1971 agreement between Tunisia 
and Libya facilitated Tunisian migration, while Egyptians were allowed entrance into the 
country merely with an identity card. They quickly became Libya’s main migrant labour 
community, occupying positions across multiple sectors of the economy (see Table 1). 
While available statistics on intra- Arab migration frequently do not give an accurate 
depiction of migrant stocks or flows, conservative estimates put the number of Egyptians 
working in Libya at 229,500 in 1975 (it would rise to 250,000 by 1980).  
Libyan migration diplomacy explicitly aimed at linking cooperation on issues of cross-
border mobility with closer political integration. As Gaddafi prepared for the creation of 
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a federation with Syria and Egypt – the Federal Arab Republic – Libya abolished entry 
visa requirements for Egyptian migrants in 1971. A similar agreement was signed with 
Tunisia in the same year, as Gaddafi sought to unify Libya with the remaining North 
African Arab tates – Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.38 Delighted at this inflow of Egyptian 
and Tunisian workers, Gaddafi tied cooperation on cross-border mobility with his 
broader, pan-Arab vision of a united Arab world. Styling himself after Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Gaddafi soon turned into ‘the self-appointed guardian of Nasser’s 
legacy nurturing the notion of Arab nationalism and unity’.39 It is unsurprising that 
Gaddafi would frequently argue that unrestricted movement of labour in the Middle East 
constituted a key step in the road to ‘the unification of all Arabic-speaking people’.40  
However, Libya’s bilateral relations with both Egypt and Tunisia quickly went sour. The 
rise to power of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat led to a heightening of tensions 
between the two states. For Gaddafi, Sadat had abandoned the pan-Arab vision espoused 
by the first Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had passed away unexpectedly 
in 1970. Egypt’s management of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War was particularly criticised by 
Gaddafi, who failed to understand the reasons behind the Egyptian refusal to deal a 
devastating blow against Israel. The defection of two majors in the Revolutionary 
Command Council of Libya to Egypt (‘Abd al-Mun’im al-Huni and ‘Umar ‘Abdallah al-
Muhayshi) was also humiliating for the Libyan leader. Gaddafi became, in turn, eager to 
provide shelter to political dissenters who had fled Egypt, including Hikmat Abu Zayd, 
who had been Egypt’s first female minister in the early 1960s. She relocated to Libya in 
1974 and, from her position at the University of Tripoli, frequently criticised Sadat’s 
policies. Partly in an effort to counterbalance Gaddafi, Sadat pursued a policy of 
rapprochement with Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiry, with whom he shared a 
distrust of Libyan regional ambitions. A breaking point was reached in April 1974, when 
Sadat blamed a failed assassination attempt against him on the Libyan regime. Egypt 
withdrew from the negotiations on the creation of the Federal Arab Republic, accusing 
Qaddafi of being mentally ill, or a ‘lunatic’.41 
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Libyan migration diplomacy, in turn, shifted to coercion, pursuing an issue-linkage 
strategy that aimed to harness Arab sending states’ foreign policy into submission. The 
failure of Gaddafi’s plan to create a unified state with Tunisia, the Arab Islamic Republic, 
resulted in a concerted backlash against Tunisian workers in Libya, as thousands of 
Tunisians would be expelled on random occasions, such as the deportation of 5000 
Tunisians in 1976.42 By late April 1974, Gaddafi ordered the deportation of hundreds of 
Egyptian migrants, many of whom were tortured before being driven to the Egypt–Libya 
border. For those Egyptian migrants who remained in the country, daily life became 
much harder, as they faced dis- crimination and abuse by Libyan military and security 
services.  
Egyptian migration diplomacy was adjusted accordingly, as Sadat legally forbade civil 
servants employed by the Egyptian state to travel to Libya regardless of reason, targeting 
the Libyan economy’s reliance on Egyptian professionals on secondment. Gaddafi 
embarked on a second round of deportations in April 1975, as one Egyptian migrant, 
Mufrih Nasr Isma’il, a migrant from Fayyoum, died in Derna, while under police custody. 
Egyptian parliamentarians and the Arab Socialist Union, the main political party at the 
time, put forth proposals for the immediate withdrawal of the entire Egyptian 
community in Libya, estimated to be 300,000 strong. The Middle East News Agency would 
report instances of ‘barbarous’ torture of Egyptian migrants at the hands of the Libyan 
security forces, which included beatings with ‘sticks, whips, and pipes’ as well as sleep 
deprivation.43  
Interestingly, Egypt never considered this issue a human rights violation. Instead, the 
Egyptian regime approached it as a political issue that was part and parcel of Libyan 
migration diplomacy. This was, firstly, evident by Sadat’s emphasis on countermeasures, 
such as the restriction of emigration outlined above. At the same time, in the midst of the 
April 1975 migration crisis, Sadat visited Saudi Arabia; Egyptian news agencies reported 
that the Saudi state ‘was ready to absorb all the Egyptian migrants working in Libya who 
now wish to leave’, in an attempt to neutralise Gaddafi’s issue-linkage strategy. Above all, 
the Egyptian regime aimed at projecting confidence in the face of Libyan coercion, 
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ensuring that Egyptian news- papers underlined that Saudi requests for Egyptian labour 
‘exceed the number of Egyptian workers in Libya’.44  
A similar strategy was employed almost a year later, in March 1976, when Libyan 
authorities reneged on the policy of allowing entry to Egyptians carrying identity cards, 
and deported over 3000 workers. The Matrouh governorate in Egypt, close to the Libyan 
border, declared a state of emergency given that deportees were unceremoniously 
abandoned at the border stations by Libyan authorities. Sayyid Fahmi, the Egyptian 
Minister of Interior, had to dispatch trains and buses to pick up the deportees. Again, 
Libyan migration diplomacy produced a number of casualties: at least one migrant 
worker died on 20 March, while Yunis ‘Abd al-’Al was completely paralysed and left 
unable to speak as a result of head injuries.45 A variety of reports were also circulated that 
male Egyptian migrants were recruited into the Libyan armed forces against their will, 
while others were tortured into relinquishing their Egyptian citizenship in favour of a 
Libyan one. Abuse continued intermittently until early October 1976, when 
approximately 2500 Egyptians were arrested in Derna, in Eastern Libya. The migrants 
were tortured before being handed over to border authorities at the Egyptian border 
station in Marsa Matrouh. Sadat continued to view Libyan migration diplomacy as a 
strategy, with Egyptians treated as bargaining chips in bilateral relations: when 
interviewed on the humanitarian crisis that had been created, Sadat mentioned that he did 
not ‘take the situation so seriously. We are ready to absorb our workers; they can find 
work here, or in other Arab countries’.46  
Gaddafi’s issue-linkage strategy in his use of coercive migration diplomacy became 
evident in January 1977, when Egypt, Syria, and Sudan announced the creation of a 
Unified Political Command. This would involve, inter alia, the build-up of military forces 
close to the Egyptian–Libyan border. Following the inspection of these forces by the 
Egyptian Minister of War on 27–28 March 1977, Gaddafi issued a declaration stating that 
‘Sadat, in his behaviour, intends to oblige us’47 to impose countermeasures on the 
Egyptian migrant population. The Libyan state ceased issuing new migrant visas to 
Egyptians, and proceeded with mass deportations of existing migrants, regardless of legal 
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status. The governor of Marsa Matrouh pre- pared to receive some 10,000 Egyptian 
deportees per day, all arriving in open-backed trucks that had been filled to capacity. 
Could such measures have an economic, rather than a political or diplomatic, rationale? 
Perhaps, it could be argued, Libya had been trying to nationalise its workforce by ridding 
itself of migrant labour. This is inconsistent with the actions of ‘Abd al-Salam Jalloud, the 
Libyan Prime Minister who, in May 1977, toured Eastern Europe in search of 
replacement migrant labour.  
Sporadic incidents with regard to Arab migrant labour occurred in later years, as the state 
of bilateral relations ebbed and flowed. In 1985, the Libyan state radio, the Voice of the 
Great Arab Homeland, declared that Egypt and other Arab states had ceased supporting 
the creation of a unified Arab state, which meant that Arab workers in Libya would be 
considered foreigners. Gaddafi denounced Arab elites as ‘monkeys’ that had ‘sold 
themselves’ to Washington. Under this logic, Arab workers were deemed to be complicit 
and measures were taken for deportation.48 In August 1985, over 5000 Tunisians had 
their belongings confiscated and were given the choice to either adopt the ‘Arab 
nationality’ or face expulsion, following Tunisian President Habib Bourghuiba’s visit to 
Washington, DC. Tunisian diplomats went on record as stating that these measures ‘were 
intended to put pressure on Tunis to cut ties with the West’.49 
Occurring at the same time, the expulsion of Egyptian workers was also part of a broader 
confrontation between the two states. Bilateral tensions were centred primarily on 
Egyptians troops’ mobilisation along the border between the two states, as well as the 
Libyan hijacking of an Egyptian airliner, both in 1985. There were estimates that 20,000 
Egyptians were deported in August and September 1985, while other reports put the 
number at 100,000.50 A similar fate awaited Tunisian migrant labour in Libya, as about 
20,000 workers were also deported on similar grounds. The Libyan Ministry of Planning 
estimates verify this tumultuous change in migrant labour numbers (Table 2).  
Finally, beyond employing migration in bilateral relations with Arab states, Gaddafi also 
attempted issue linkage with regard to the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. In September 1994, 
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he declared his opposition to the Oslo peace accords process between Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberalisation Organization (PLO), arguing that ‘what is happening in the 
name of peace is nothing but a surrender and a recognition of the existence of Israel at 
the expense of Palestinians’.51 Deportations of Palestinians began in mid-1995, as 
approximately 1000 workers were abandoned on the Egyptian borders, with further 
threats by Gaddafi to deport some 30,000 Palestinians (that never materialised), as an 
instrument of pressure to the PLO:  
This is not a return and not an expulsion. This is pushing the 
Palestinians, in accordance with their wishes or not, to return to 
Palestine ... This is the first point we want to correct and show that 
there is a great deception, disregard of the Arabs and misdirection of the 
international public opinion concerning what is happening now to the 
Palestinians.52  
 
Libyan migration diplomacy towards Africa and Europe  
Libya under Gaddafi did not employ migration diplomacy merely in its bilateral workings 
with the Arab world, but also employed it with regard to its relations with sub-Saharan 
African countries, as well as the EU and individual EU member states, most notably 
Italy, particularly given Libya’s increasing regional and international isolation. This 
phenomenon intensified once Gaddafi abandoned his interest in Arab unity in favour of 
pan-Africanism: once the end of the Cold War marked the end of superpower aid to 
African states, Gaddafi identified a new opportunity for Libyan leadership. This section 
examines how Libyan migration diplomacy towards African states aimed at projecting 
Gaddafi’s role in constructing the federal ‘United States of Africa’, as he repeatedly 
announced, ‘to transform the continent into a single nation-state ruled by a single 
government’.53 With regard to Europe, this section details Gaddafi’s primarily coercive 
migration diplomacy, as he tried to employ Libya’s status as a transit state of irregular 
migration for military, political and economic purposes.54  
Reminiscent of Gaddafi’s strategy vis-a ̀-vis Arab elites, the country’s migration diplomacy 
towards African sending states coincided with Libya’s wish to pursue closer ties of 
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cooperation. From the early 1990s onwards, as Gaddafi became less interested in pan-
Arabism and, instead, sought to spearhead closer ties among African states under pan-
Africanism, he utilised cooperative migration diplomacy: a 1990 integration charter with 
Sudan, a 1994 agreement with Chad, and the 1998 creation of the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CENSAD) contained numerous objectives regarding the free movement 
of people. Gradually, Gaddafi employed Libya’s position as a host state for African 
labour in order to further his diplomatic openings towards African states. While 
immigration had distinct economic advantages for the Libyan economy at the time, ‘the 
regime sought a leadership role in the inter- national arena to counter its increasing 
isolation from Arab countries and the West’.55  
Yet Libya gradually lost its appeal as a host state for African labour; ‘each period of inter- 
state tension is followed by expulsions, whose victims have been the Tunisians, the 
Egyptians, and Palestinians’, Pliez described. ‘But it is now increasingly those from sub-
Saharan countries’.56 The regime deliberately stoked anti-migrant racism, leading to mass 
anti-African riots in 2000. These resulted in the death of 130 migrants and the 
subsequent expulsion of thou- sands of African migrants. Gaddafi’s attempts to not 
upset African states or his claims to pan-Africanism, while also abandoning the 
responsibility to provide employment for an ever-increasing number of African migrants, 
led the regime to reassess its position on Libyan migration diplomacy. Libya, from the 
early 2000s onwards, adopted the position of a transit, rather than host, state for sub-
Saharan and West African labour. 
Following this shift, Libyan migration diplomacy would target the EU and individual 
member states, as Gaddafi’s issue-linkage strategy initially aimed at the lifting of 
economic sanctions, imposed upon Libya since 1986. He tellingly declared, in June 2002, 
that ‘no North African state wishes to guard the gates of Europe for free, as our region is 
invaded by sub-Saharan migrants’.57 Gaddafi’s migration diplomacy entailed the gradual 
release of irregular migration into Italy, in an attempt that Greenhill has characterised as 
‘capacity-swamping’, aiming to coerce the target state into submission. In late 2004, Libya 
declared that it would ‘no longer act as Europe’s coast guard’, as Gaddafi demanded the 
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lifting of European economic sanctions against Libya.58 This was preceded by months of 
putting pressure on European states, particularly Italy, which had received almost 10,000 
African migrants to the island of Lampedusa, via the Libyan route – or, as it has been 
termed since, the Central Mediterranean route. In mid-2003, shortly before Italy was due 
to take the helm of the EU Council presidency, it launched a campaign to convince other 
EU member states of the need to remove the arms embargo against Libya, as weapons 
were necessary to combat African irregular migration.59 Faced with lacklustre European 
support, Italy went so far as to threaten a unilateral lifting of economic sanctions against 
Libya. Eventually, Libya’s coercive migration diplomacy was successful, and the EU 
embargo was fully lifted.  
A few years later, in 2007–2008, irregular migration through Libya into Italy peaked again 
at some 37,000 migrants intercepted at its borders, as opposed to 19,000 in 2006. 
Gaddafi aimed to have Rome offer a formal apology for its colonial brutalities in Italian 
Libya. On 30 August 2008, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi offered a formal 
apology from Benghazi, as the two leaders signed a friendship and cooperation treaty. 
Besides an Italian commitment of $5 billion towards developing Libyan infrastructure 
over 20 years, Berlusconi offered a condemnation of Italian colonialism in the region:  
‘In the name of the Italian people, as head of the government, I feel it 
my duty to apologise and express my sorrow for what happened many 
years ago and left a scar on many of your families’60  
In return, Libya agreed to cooperate with Italy against irregular migration, as stipulated in 
Article 19 of the treaty. This clearly stated Libya’s need to comply with previous 
agreements and protocols, as well as to allow the 2000-km-long Libyan coast to be 
protected by Italian patrolled boats, carrying mixed crews. Its land borders were also to 
be monitored, by a satellite detection system. Joint patrols began in 2009 and, by 2010, 
the EU declared the project to be a success, reducing irregular migration to a fraction of 
its former volume (3200 detections in the first seven months of 2009, as opposed to 
40,000 detections in 2008), and an overall reduction in border crossings (see Figure 1).  
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Finally, beyond ensuring the end of the EU embargo and a formal apology for Italy’s 
colonial past, Libya’s migration diplomacy under Gaddafi also aimed at purely economic 
benefits: in an August 2010 EU–Africa Summit in Italy, Gaddafi proposed that he could 
take the role of guarding Europe’s borders, as:  
Tomorrow Europe might no longer be European, and even black, as 
there are millions that want to come in ... We don’t know what will 
happen, what will be the reaction of the white and Christian Europeans 
faced with this influx of starving and ignorant Africans ... We don’t 
know if Europe will remain an advanced and united continent or if it 
will be destroyed, as happened with the barbarian invasions. (quoted in 
The Guardian, August 31, 2010)  
Gaddafi’s issue-linkage strategy aimed at securing €5 billion (£4.1 billion) a year in order 
to ensure that Europe would not ‘turn black’.61 A few years before, during a meeting of 
the African Union, Qaddafi stated that  
We will ask Europe to pay 10 billion euros per year if it really wants to 
stop migration toward Europe... Europeans who do not want to take 
the immigrants should either emigrate to American or pay Libya to keep 
its borders closed.62  
 
Conclusion  
This article addressed the ways in which cross-border population mobility features in the 
international relations of Global South states. It has put forth, firstly, the concept of 
migration diplomacy as a more accurate conceptualisation of states’ employment of 
diplomatic tools, processes and procedures distinctly related to migration. Secondly, it 
identified how migration diplomacy within the Global South takes the form of issue-
linkage strategies of inter- state cooperation or coercion. The article demonstrated both 
types of migration diplomacy through an examination of Libya under Colonel Gaddafi, 
between 1969 and 2011. Going beyond the limitations of existing approaches, it has 
identified how Libyan policymaking was driven by issue-linkage strategies with regard to 
Arab, African and European target states. Libya aimed to gain foreign policy concessions 
from Arab sending states in the pre- 1990 period; in the post-1990 period, it aimed to 
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gain various concessions from the EU and individual European member states, as well as 
support for Gaddafi’s vision of a ‘united’ Africa.  
The strategic selection of the Libyan case attempted to address the obstacles of 
generalisability via a single-case study by allowing the generation and analysis of data 
needed to provide robust answers to the article’s research question, and by providing rich 
insights into the mechanisms at play. How does the article’s theorisation travel beyond 
the Libyan case? Arguably, both cooperative and coercive migration diplomacy has been 
traditional to varying extents for a number of states within the Global South. Examples 
of issue-linkage practices within the Arab world, in particular, abound: coercive migration 
diplomacy was employed by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein against Egypt in 1990, when 
he ordered the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers from Iraq 
partly to coerce Egypt into abandoning support for Operation Desert Storm. The same 
year, Saudi Arabia also pursued coercive migration diplomacy against Yemen, which had 
refused to denounce the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the United Nations Security Council, 
by deporting some 800,000 Yemeni migrants.63 But the Middle East also features 
instances of cooperative migration diplomacy, such as the organised export of Egyptian 
professionals for developmental purposes across the Arab world under President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser.64 Beyond the Middle East, the case of Cuba provides instances of both 
coercive migration diplomacy, taking the form of engineered refugee crises targeted 
against the United States,65 and cooperative migration diplomacy, known as Cuban 
‘medical internationalism’. Under the auspices of the latter, thousands of Cuban doctors, 
nurses and other medical staff are dispatched in other Latin American and African states 
as a form of ‘soft power’.66  
Overall, the article has argued for the importance of the concept of migration diplomacy 
in highlighting the importance of population mobility for interstate relations in the 
Global South. It has also introduced issue linkage as a framework for comprehending 
states’ increasingly common coercive and cooperative strategies in migration 
management. Beyond theoretical relevance, the article aims to shed light on current 
policy matters, such as the 2016 EU–Turkey agreement, which grants Turkey certain 
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political and economic concessions in return for its management of Syrian refugees – an 
agreement that Turkey has been threatening to renege upon, again as part of its coercive 
migration diplomacy. Future research is needed in order to enhance the article’s 
theoretical framework, possibly by examining how states’ domestic constrains affect their 
migration diplomacy strategies, in both the Global South and the Global North. The 
importance of cross-border population mobility in shaping states’ diplomatic practices 
constitutes a fascinating, albeit under-theorised, field of study.  
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